- The egress job runs through WorkerHelper.getEgressRecoveryJob(), like
the cleanup jobs, instead of a direct service call from the queue
- Toggling egressCheckEnabled resets the egress state and removes any
pending recovery job
- Probes resolve and pass the proxy, so http targets honour the global
proxy as monitors do
- PingProvider keeps IPv6 addresses intact instead of truncating at the
first colon
- Egress targets are parsed by one function shared by the validator and
the probe; malformed addresses such as unbalanced brackets are rejected
- Notification id pattern drops the /i flag, which produced an invalid
OpenAPI pattern
- EgressState findSingleton reads before it writes, so a read no longer
bumps updatedAt
- "disabled" is a distinct assessment result and is cached like any other
- Concurrent failures share an in-flight assessment for as long as it
runs, then reuse the settled result for 5 s
- The recovery job row is only removed if nobody rescheduled it since
this run claimed it, so a concurrent new episode keeps its job
- Deleting a notification removes it from egressNotifications
🔧
Adds the EgressService that probes a configurable set of reliability targets
(ping, TCP or HTTP) when asked, persists a single instance-wide egress state
document, and runs a recovery poll loop while egress is degraded. Adds the four
egress settings fields with validation. The worker constructs and initialises
the service but nothing calls assessAfterFailure yet, so behaviour is unchanged.
🔧
ntfy servers that require auth rejected every Checkmate alert because the
provider posted without an Authorization header, so alerts to protected
topics failed silently.
Adds ntfyAuthType ("none" | "token" | "basic"):
- token: Authorization: Bearer <accessToken>
- basic: Authorization: Basic base64(ntfyUsername:accessToken)
Both types store their secret in the existing accessToken field rather than
introducing a new secret, so credential handling stays in one place.
Incomplete credentials fail the send instead of falling back to an anonymous
post, and validation rejects partial auth config up front so a channel can't
be saved looking authenticated while posting anonymously.
Backend only; frontend follows once this lands.
Closes#3717
Reject status page custom CSS containing @import or a url() / image-set()
/ image() / cross-fade() whose target is http(s) or protocol-relative,
while allowing data: and relative URLs. The check normalizes comments and
CSS escapes first so obfuscated forms cannot slip past. Enforced in the
create/update body validation.
Bound customCSS to 100000 characters on both the client schema and the
server body validation (the server is the enforcement boundary; multer's
1MB field cap was the only limit), regenerate the OpenAPI spec, and add
a validation test suite covering acceptance, clearing, the length cap,
and type rejection.
Addresses reviewer feedback by enforcing strict validation on the array. Previously, the Zod schema accepted any arbitrary number, which could allow invalid or self-defined HTTP codes (e.g., 5000) to be saved to the database.
Refs #3657
Craig Lawson
Jan Kahmen
Alex Holliday
egeoztass
Marcos Paulo Diniz
Arnaud GRIMBERT
Buco7854
harsh-aghara